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Abstract
A new recursive regression methodology is introduced to analyze the bubble characteristics
of various …nancial time series during the subprime crisis. The methods modify a technique
proposed in Phillips, Wu and Yu (2010) and provide a technology for identifying bubble behavior and consistent dating of their origination and collapse. The tests also serve as an early
warning diagnostic of bubble activity. Seven relevant …nancial series are investigated, including three …nancial assets (the Nasdaq index, home price index and asset-backed commercial
paper), two commodities (the crude oil price and platinum price), one bond rate (Baa), and
one exchange rate (Pound/USD). Statistically signi…cant bubble characteristics are found in
all of these series. The empirical estimates of the origination and collapse dates suggest an
interesting migration mechanism among the …nancial variables: a bubble …rst emerged in the
equity market during mid-1995 lasting to the end of 2000, followed by a bubble in the real
estate market between January 2001 and July 2007 and in the mortgage market between November 2005 and August 2007. After the subprime crisis erupted, the phenomenon migrated
selectively into the commodity market and the foreign exchange market, creating bubbles which
subsequently burst at the end of 2008, just as the e¤ects on the real economy and economic
growth became manifest. Our empirical estimates of the origination and collapse dates match
well with the general datetimes of this crisis put forward in a recent study by Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2008).
Keywords: Financial bubbles, Crashes, Date stamping, Explosive behavior, Mildly explosive
process, Subprime crisis, Timeline.
JEL classi…cation: C15, G12

There is a very real danger, fellow citizens, that the Icelandic economy in the
worst case could be sucked into the whirlpool, and the result could be national bankruptcy (Prime Minister Geir Haarde, televised address to Icelandic Nation, October
8, 2008)
Between 40 and 45 percent of the world’s wealth has been destroyed in little less
than a year and a half. (Stephen Schwarzman, March 11, 2009)
Federal Reserve policymakers should deepen their understanding about how to
combat speculative bubbles to reduce the chances of another …nancial crisis (Donald
Kohn, Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman, March 24, 2010)
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Introduction

Financial bubbles have been a longstanding topic of interest for economists, involving both
theorists and empirical researchers. Some of the main issues have focused on mechanisms for
modeling bubbles, reconciling bubble-like behavior in the context of rational expectations of
future earnings, mechanisms for detecting bubbles, and measuring their extent, exploring causes
and the psychology of investor behavior, and considering suitable policy responses. While there
is general agreement that …nancial bubbles give rise to misallocation of resources and can have
serious e¤ects on real economic activity, as yet there has been little consensus among economists
and policy makers on how to address the many issues raised above.
The global …nancial turmoil over 2008-2009, triggered by the subprime crisis in the US
and its subsequent e¤ect on commodity markets, exchange rates and real economic activity,
has led to renewed interest among economists in …nancial bubbles and their potential global
consequences. There is now widespread recognition among policy makers as well as economists
that changes in the global economy over the last decade, far from decoupling economic activity
as was earlier believed, have led to powerful latent …nancial linkages that have increased risks
in the event of a large common shock. The magnitude of the crisis is so large, the mechanism
so complex, and the consequences so important to the real economy that understanding the
phenomena, exploring its causes and mapping its evolution have presented major challenges to
the economics profession. As the headers that lead this article indicate, a substantial percentage
of the world’s accrued wealth has been destroyed within 18 months of the subprime crisis with
manifold e¤ects ranging from the collapse of major …nancial institutions to the near bankruptcy
of national economies. There is also recognition that new empirical methods are needed to
improve understanding of speculative phenomena and to provide early warning diagnostics of
1

Figure 1: Time series plots of real prices for three …nancial assets: monthly observations on the
Nasdaq index from February 1973 to January 2009; monthly observations on the house price
index from January 1987 to January 2009; monthly observations on the outstanding value of
asset backed commercial paper from January 2001 to January 2009. All series are normalized
by the CPI. The estimated bubble origination and collapse dates are also shown on the …gures.

…nancial bubbles.
The recent background of …nancial exuberance and collapse with concatenating e¤ects
across markets and nations provides a rich new environment for empirical research. The most
urgent ongoing questions relate to matters of …scal, monetary, and regulatory policies for securing …nancial stability and buttressing real economic activity. In this regard, there have been
serious disagreements among economists and policy makers about the e¤ectiveness and consequences of various bailout and recovery plans proposed by North American, European and
Asian governments to deal with the …nancial crisis. Beyond these immediate policy issues are
underlying questions relating to the emergence of the phenomena and its evolutionary course
through the …nancial and economic systems. It is these latter issues that form the focus of
interest of the present paper.
The subprime crisis is not an isolated empirical event. In a recent article, Caballero, Farhi
and Gourinchas (2008a, CFG hereafter) argued that the Internet bubble in the 1990s, the asset
bubbles over 2005-2006, the subprime crisis in 2007, and the commodity bubbles of 2008 are
2

all closely related. Similar views of the interconnectedness of the crisis phenomena are held by
most economists and media commentators and this interpretation is also generally supported
by the timeline in which the various crisis events have unfolded. CFG go further and put
forward a sequential hypothesis concerning bubble creation and collapse that accounts for the
course of the …nancial turmoil in the U.S. economy using a simple general equilibrium model
without monetary factors but with goods that may be partially securitized. Date stamping
the timeline of the origination and collapse of the various bubbles is a critical element in the
validity of this sequential hypothesis.
The present paper uses new econometric methodology to test if and when bubbles emerged
and collapsed in the stock market, the real estate market, the mortgage market, the commodity
market, and the foreign exchange market over the period surrounding the subprime crisis.
Many series are studied. In particular, we investigate the bubble characteristics in the Nasdaq
index over February 1973 to January 2009, the U.S. house price index over January 1987
to January 2009, outstanding asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) over January 2001 to
January 2009, the price of crude oil over January 1999 to January 2009, platinum prices over
January 1999 to January 2009, Baa bond rates over January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009, and
Pound/USD exchange rates over March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009. Figs. 1-3 show the time
series plot of the …rst three, next two, and last two series, respectively. Our methods enable
us to determine whether a bubble emerged in each series, date stamp the origination in that
event, and correspondingly assess whether the bubble collapsed and the date of that collapse.
The empirical date stamps so determined are then matched against the hypothesized sequence
of events described in the model of CFG.
The econometric methods used here are closely related to those proposed in Phillips, Wu
and Yu (2009, PWY hereafter). In particular, the methods rely on forward recursive regressions
coupled with sequential right-sided unit root tests. The sequential tests assess period by period
evidence for unit root behavior against mildly explosive alternatives. Mildly explosive behavior
may be modeled by an autoregressive process with a root ( ) that exceeds unity but that is still
in the general vicinity of unity. Phillips and Magdalinos (2007a, 2007b, PM hereafter) show
that this ‘mildly explosive’vicinity of unity can be successfully modeled in terms of deviations
of the form

1 = c=kn > 0, where c is a positive constant and kn is a sequence that passes

to in…nity with, but more slowly than, the sample size n; so that

! 1: These processes

therefore involve only mild departures from strict (rational) martingale behavior in markets.
They include submartingale processes of the type that have been used to model rational bubble
behavior in …nance (Evans, 1991; Campbell, Lo and McKinley, 1998). PM (2007a, 2007b) have
3

investigated this class of process, developed a large sample asymptotic theory, and shown that
these models are amenable to econometric inference, unlike purely explosive processes for which
no central limit theory is applicable. An important di¤erence between the methods proposed in
the current paper and those in PWY lies in the manner in which the initialization is handled.
In PWY, the initial condition is …xed to be the …rst observation in the full sample whereas
in the current paper the initial observation is selected based on an information criterion. The
use of information criteria in the selection of the the initial observation allows for sharper
identi…cation of the bubble origination date.
PWY applied forward recursive regression methods to Nasdaq stock prices during the 1990s,
and using sequential tests against mildly explosive alternatives were able to date-stamp the
origination of …nancial exuberance in the Nasdaq market to mid-1995, prior to the famous
remark of Alan Greenspan in December 1996 about irrational exuberance in …nancial markets.
This test therefore revealed that there was anticipatory empirical evidence supporting mildly
explosive behavior in stock prices over a year prior to Greenspan’s remarks. In ongoing work,
Phillips and Yu (2009) have developed a limit theory for this date stamping technology and
checked the …nite sample capability of this procedure to identify and date bubble behavior.
The date stamp estimators were shown to be consistent for the origination and collapse of
bubble behavior and the dating mechanism was shown to work well in …nite samples.
The present paper uses this methodology to explore the sequential pattern of events of the
current …nancial crisis. Dating helps to characterize the phenomena by identifying the individual events and by …xing their extent and sequencing. It may be viewed as a …rst step in
understanding the phenomena and in searching for causes of the behavioral changes involved
in bubble origination and collapse. Date stamping also assists in evaluating hypotheses about
the concatenation of bubble activity over time and across markets, such as those developed in
CFG. The forward recursive regression approach used here enables early identi…cation of the
appearance of mildly explosive behavior in asset prices, thereby providing anticipatory evidence
of a (local) move away from martingale behavior. This evidence may be used as an early warning diagnostic of (…nancial) exuberance and thereby assist policy makers in surveillance and
regulatory actions, as urged by Fed Vice Chairman Donald Kohn in the header of this article.
Similarly, the approach helps to identify a subsequent switch back to martingale behavior as
explosive sentiment collapses.
Empirical evidence of emergent mildly explosive behavior is found in many of the time series
studied here, and in all of the series (except for the Pound/USD exchange rate) manifesting
mildly explosive behavior there is further evidence of subsequent collapse. Figs. 1-3 show
4

Figure 2: Time series plots of real prices for two commodities: monthly observations of crude
oil prices and monthly observations of platinum prices, both from January 1999 to January
2009. Both series are normalized by the CPI. The estimated bubble origination and collapse
dates are also shown on the …gures.
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Figure 3: Time series plots of two …nancial variable: daily observations of Baa bond rates from
January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009 and weekly observations of Pound/USD exchange rates
from March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009. The estimated bubble origination and collapse dates
are also shown on the …gures.
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the origination and collapse dates for the bubbles identi…ed in the seven …nancial time series
mentioned earlier. For the three series depicted in Fig. 1, the bubbles emerged and collapsed
prior to the subprime crisis. For the two series depicted in Fig. 2 and the two series depicted
in Fig. 3, the bubbles all emerged after the subprime crisis. These …ndings reveal a sequence
of mildly explosive events each followed by a …nancial collapse that corroborates the sequential
hypothesis given in CFG. Consideration of a wider group of related …nancial series following
the eruption of the subprime crisis indicates that bubbles of the type found in the series in
Figs. 2-3 are not always evident in other commodities or currencies. Accordingly, the empirical
evidence supports a selective migration of the bubble activity through …nancial markets as the
subprime crisis evolved and liquid funds searched for safe havens.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the econometric methodology for
dating bubble characteristics, discusses rational bubble and variable discount rate sources of
…nancial exuberance, outlines some of the relevant facts concerning the subprime crisis, and
relates the timeline implications of the theoretical results obtained in CFG (2008a). Section 3
describes the data that is used in the present empirical study. Section 4 presents the empirical
…ndings and matches the estimates to the theory of CFG (2008a). Section 5 concludes.

2

Bubbles, the Subprime Crisis, and Econometric Dating

2.1

Bubbles and Crashes

In the popular press, the term “…nancial bubble” refers to a situation where the price of a
…nancial asset rapidly increases and does so in a speculative manner that is distinct from what
is considered to be the asset’s intrinsic value. The term carries the innuendo that the increase
is not justi…ed by economic fundamentals and that there is, accordingly, risk of a subsequent
collapse in which the asset price falls precipitously. In such cases, the bubble phenomenon is
typically con…rmed in retrospect.
A common de…nition that makes this usage precise is that bubble conditions arise when
the price of an asset signi…cantly exceeds the fundamental value that is determined by the
discounted expected value of the cash ‡ows that ownership of the asset can generate. However,
discount rates may be variable and, as demonstrated below, the time pro…le of the discount
rate can have important e¤ects on the characteristics of the fundamental price and may even
propagate explosive price behavior.
An important secondary characteristic of the bubble phenomenon is that during both the
run up and run down periods the asset is subject to high volume trading in which the direction
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of change is widely anticipated (and relied upon), as distinct from normal market conditions in
which the asset price follows a near martingale. It is this deviation from martingale behavior
that provides a mechanism for identifying both the emergence of the boom phase of a bubble
behavior and its subsequent crash.
This distinction is recognized in the rational bubble literature, which characterizes the boom
phase of a bubble in terms of explosive dynamics or submartingale behavior. This property
contrasts with the e¢ cient market martingale property, which implies unit root time series
dynamic behavior. To explain the di¤erence in terms of the commonly used present value
model, let Pt be the stock price at time t before the dividend payout, Dt be the dividend
payo¤ from the asset at time t, and r be the discount rate (r > 0). The standard no arbitrage
condition implies that
Pt =

1
Et (Pt+1 + Dt+1 );
1+r

(1)

and recursive substitution yields

where Ft =

1
P

Pt = Ft + Bt ;

(2)

Et (Bt+1 ) = (1 + r)Bt :

(3)

(1 + r) i Et (Dt+i ) and

i=1

Hence, the asset price is decomposed into two components, a “fundamental” component, Ft ;
that is determined by expected future dividends, and a supplementary solution corresponding
to the “bubble” component, Bt : In the absence of bubble conditions, Pt = Ft . Otherwise,
Pt = Ft + Bt and price embodies the explosive component Bt ; which satis…es the submartingale
property (3). Consequently, under bubble conditions, Pt will manifest the explosive behavior
inherent in Bt . This explosive property is very di¤erent from the random wandering (or unit
root) behavior that is present in Ft when Dt is a martingale and that is commonly found for
asset prices in the empirical literature.
Over long periods of time, some asset prices like equities also tend to manifest empirical
evidence of a drift component. Unit root time series with a drift can generate periods of runup if the variance of the martingale component is small and the drift is strong enough. But
accumulated gains in such cases are at most of O(n) for sample size n: In practice, of course,
the drift component is usually small and is generally negligible over short periods, so the unit
root behavior is the dominant characteristic and clear evidence of gains only shows up over long
horizons. On the other hand, the run up rate in an explosive process is O((1 + r)n ) for some
r > 0, as in (3), and is therefore much greater. This di¤erence between linear and exponential
8

growth combined with the nonlinear curvature in an explosive process are testable properties
distinguishing the two processes. In terms of model (1) and its solution (2), both Bt and Pt
increase rapidly during the boom phase of the bubble according to Et (Bt+h ) = (1 + r)h Bt
and the initialization B0 > 0: But when the bubble conditions collapse and the particular
solution disappears, Pt = Ft which corresponds to a sudden collapse in the asset price. If the
dividend process Dt follows a martingale, re‡ecting market conditions generating cash ‡ows,
then Ft is similarly a martingale and is cointegrated with Dt . Under such conditions, the
presence of an additional “rational bubble”submartingale component Bt in Pt can account for
an explosive-type run up in the asset price Pt .
Explosiveness in Bt and hence in Pt suggests that Pt is predictable during an explosive
period. While this may be at odds with the e¢ cient market hypothesis, the predictability in
stock returns at short horizons is consistent with what has been documented in the recent empirical literature –see, for example, Ang and Bekaert (2006). At longer horizons, explosiveness
is subject to collapse, generating a (long run) martingale like feature in the price and making
returns more di¢ cult to predict. This latter …nding is also empirically documented in Ang and
Bekaert (2006).
Importantly, making the discount factor rt either stationary or integrated of order one does
not change qualitatively our analysis because the implications for the statistical properties of
Ft ; Bt and Pt are the same as with the constant r. For example, if rt is stationary, (3) becomes
Et (Bt+1 ) = (1 + rt )Bt :
Then, if (3) is …tted, r =

T (1
t=1

+ rt )

1=T

(4)

> 1, implying an explosive process for Bt and hence

Pt ; even if Ft itself is not explosive.

2.2

The E¤ects of a Time Varying Discount Rate

This paper interprets explosiveness in price as su¢ cient evidence for bubbles and this interpretation holds true under a varieties of assumptions on the discount rate. As indicated above,
certain time pro…les for the discount rate can have an important e¤ect on the characteristics of
the fundamental price. The present section illustrates this possibility by developing a simple
propagating mechanism for explosive behavior in the fundamental price under a time varying
discount rate.
If dividends grow at a constant rate rD with rD < r in (1),1 the fundamental value of the
1
This assumption obviously violates the assumption we adopted earlier, namely, constancy, stationarity or
integration of order 1.
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stock price
Ft =

Dt
:
r rD

(5)

This is the well-known Gordon growth model. It is evident that in this case the fundamental
value can be very sensitive to changes in r when r is close to rD . In fact, the fundamental value
diverges as r & rD ; so that a price run-up is evidently possible under certain time pro…les for

the discount rate. This simple Gordon model reveals the potential impact of a time varying
discount rate, but it provides no price dynamics. The following argument provides an analytic
formulation that shows how an explosive time path in fundamental values can be generated by
time variation in the discount rate.
Consider a continuous time version of (5) with time varying discount rate rt , viz.,
Z 1
Ft =
exp( srt+s )Et Dt+s ds:

(6)

0

Suppose dividends have a constant expected growth rate rD such that
Et Dt+s = exp(rD s)Dt ;

(7)

and then Dt is a martingale when rD = 0. Combining (6) and (7)
Z 1
Ft =
exp( s(rt+s rD ))Dt ds:

(8)

0

Given some …xed time point tb ; constants ca > 0 and

1

>

2

> 0; let the time pro…le of the

discount rate rt+s for t 2 (0; tb ] be as follows:
rt+s =

rD + tb st s ca +
rD + ca + s2

1

s

for 0 s < tb t
:
for s tb t

Then, the discount rate decreases towards some level rD +
level rD + ca +

2

tb t

1

tb t

(9)

as t + s % tb and jumps to the

immediately thereafter, as shown in Fig. 4. Thus, the time pro…le of the

discount factor has a structural break at tb in which a higher rate of discounting occurs at tb :
The break itself widens asymptotically as t % tb :
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Figure 4: Time Path of the Discount Rate rt+s in (9)

We then have
Ft =Dt =

Z

1

exp( s(rt+s

rD ))ds

0

=

Z

tb t

exp( ca (tb

0

= e
=
=

1

e

"
h

1

ca
e

1

ca (tb t s)

e

ca
1

#tb

e

s)

1 )ds+

e

2

i

t

+e
+

e

1

e

ca

1

exp( ca s

2 )ds

tb t

ca s 1

e

2

ca

0

ca (tb t)

e

+

ca

t

Z

2

ca

e

tb t

ca (tb t)

ca (tb t)

:=

t;

and the time path of Ft =Dt is explosive over t 2 (0; tb ]: Over this interval, Ft evolves according
to the di¤erential equation

dFt = e
Since ca Ft =Dt = e
dFt =

1

e

+ e

e

2

e 2
1 + (e

e

2

e

1

e

1

2

e

1

e

ca (tb t) ;

ca (tb t)

Dt dt +

t dDt :

we have

ca (tb t)

e
1

)e

c F dt
ca (tb t) a t
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+

t dDt ;

for t 2 (0; tb ]:

For t close to tb the generating mechanism for Ft is approximately
dFt =

e
n
=
1

e 2
1 + (e
(

e

which is an explosive di¤usion because
n
cb = 1

since ca > 0 and e

(

1

2)

e

ca Ft dt + t dDt
e 1)
o
2)
ca Ft dt + t dDt ;

2
1

e

1

(

2)

1

o

ca > 0;

< 1: The discrete time path of Ft in this neighbourhood is therefore

propagated by an explosive autoregressive process with coe¢ cient

= ecb > 1:

The heuristic explanation of this behavior is as follows. As t % tb there is growing antici-

pation that the discount factor will soon increase. Under such conditions, investors anticipate

the present to become more important in valuing assets. This anticipation in turn leads to
an in‡ation of current valuations and price fundamentals Ft become explosive as this process
continues.
On the other hand, for t > tb we have
rt+s = rD + ca +
and then
Ft =Dt =
=

Z

1

Z0 1

2

s

for s > 0 ;

exp( s(rt+s
exp( ca s

rD ))ds
2 )ds

0

= e
So, Ft =

e

2

ca

2

e

ca s 1

ca

0

=

e

2

ca

:

Dt for t > tb and price fundamentals are collinear with Dt : When Dt is a Brownian

motion or an integrated process in discrete time, Ft and Dt are cointegrated. Thus, after time
tb ; price fundamentals comove with Dt :
It follows that the time pro…le (9) for the discount rate rt induces a subinterval of explosive
behavior in Ft before tb : In this deterministic setting, it is known as time tb approaches that
there will be an upwards shift in the discount factor that makes present valuations more important. A more realistic model might allow for uncertainty in this time pro…le and a stochastic
trajectory for rt that accommodated potential upwards shifts of this type.
Econometric dating procedures of the type described below may be used to assess evidence
for subperiods of explosive price behavior that are induced by such time variation in the discount
factor, just as for other potential sources of …nancial exuberance.
12

2.3

Subprime Crisis and Event Timeline

The subprime mortgage crisis is generally regarded as an important triggering element in the
ongoing global …nancial crisis. The subprime event began with a dramatic rise in mortgage
delinquencies and foreclosures starting in late 2006 in the US, as easy initial adjustment rate
mortgage terms began to expire and re…nancing became more di¢ cult at the same time as
house prices were falling. The event had wider and, soon, global consequences because of the
huge scale of mortgage backed securities (MBS) in the …nancial system, extending the impact of
mortgage failure to the asset positions of investment and commercial banks. The crisis became
apparent in the last week of July 2007 when German bank regulators and government o¢ cials
organized a $5 billion bail out of IKB, a small bank in Germany. We may therefore treat the
beginning of August 2007 as the public onset date of the subprime crisis, although the realities
in terms of rising mortgage delinquencies commenced earlier.
Much has already been written about the causes of this crisis and a host of factors have been
suggested, including poor appreciation of the risks associated with MBS, weak underwriting
standards and risk assessment practices in general, increasingly complex …nancial products,
high levels of …nancial leverage with associated vulnerabilities, shortfalls in understanding the
impact of large common shocks on the …nancial system, and inadequate monitoring by policy
makers and regulators of the accumulating risk exposure in the …nancial markets. We refer
readers to Brunnermeier (2008), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008) and Hull (2008)
for detailed discussions of the subprime crisis and its manifold implications. Our concern in the
present paper is with the crisis timeline and, more speci…cally, the issues of empirically dating
the origination and collapse of the various …nancial bubbles that occurred as the crisis events
unfolded.
Prior to the subprime crisis and following the collapse in dot.com stocks in 2000-2001, the
housing market in many states of the US sustained rapid increases in valuations fueled by a
period of low interest rates, large foreign capital in‡ows, and high-risk lending practices of
…nancial institutions. In the resulting boom, home ownership in the US increased to 69.2% in
2004 from 64% in 1994 (Callis and Cavanaugh, 2007) and nominal house prices increased by
more than 180% over the period 1997-2006 (Panel 2 in Fig. 1). Household debt, as a percentage of disposable income, increased from 77% to 127% over the period 1990-2007 (Economist,
November 22, 2008). At the same time, the MBS market, derived from residential mortgages,
mushroomed, and major banks and …nancial institutions around the world invested in securities that were ultimately founded on the U.S. housing market. For example, the nominal

13

outstanding amount of asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) increased by more than 80%
over the period July 2004 to July 2007 (See Panel 3 of Fig. 1).
The concatenation of events that occured after the housing market peaked in 2005 and went
into decline, followed by the subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent repercussions on …nancial
institutions over 2007-2008 and …nally the impact on world trade and real economic activity, is
now well known. Securities backed by subprime mortgages lost most of their value, investors lost
con…dence, and liquidity dried up as money ‡owed to assets which appeared to have inherently
lower risk, such as Treasury bonds, and to other assets like commodities, and currencies such
as the U.S. dollar and the Japanese Yen (mainly through the unwinding of the carry trade
industry), generating a so-called ‡ight-to-quality. In consequence, commodity prices soared,
some currencies like the U.S. dollar appreciated, while others like the British pound rapidly
declined. As the crisis deepened, stock markets around the world fell, and commercial banks,
mortgage lenders and insurance companies failed. Consumption and investment expenditures
dropped, many OECD economies went into serious recession, export driven economies in Asia
sustained double digit percentage declines in exports, growth slowed signi…cantly in China,
and world trade declined. Concomitant with these real economic e¤ects, global demand for
commodities declined and commodity prices fell.
In a recent study, CFG (2008a) proposed a model which seeks to explain the main features
of this sequence of complex interlinked …nancial crises. The CFG model links together global
…nancial asset scarcity, global imbalances, the real estate bubble, the subprime crisis, and the
commodity bubble in a general equilibrium macroeconomic environment without monetary
factors. The model is based on CFG (2008b) and assumes that the economy has two countries
(U and M ) and features two goods (X and Z). A key part of the CFG framework is a sequence
of hypotheses involving successive bubble creations and collapses, which we brie‡y review as
follows.
Country U is interpreted as the U.S. and country M as the emerging market economies and
commodity producers. Good X is a non-storable good, a fraction of which can be capitalized,
and is produced by both countries. Good Z is a storable commodity and is produced only
by country M . A presumption in the model is that there exists a global imbalance at period
t0 . The imbalance can be interpreted as arising from continuing capital ‡ows from emerging
markets to the U.S. as the U.S. runs a growing trade de…cit with emergent economies, which
in turn rely more heavily on export driven growth.
In order to allow country U to have both a large current account de…cit and low interest
rates, a fundamental assumption that CFG makes is that a bubble developed initially in country
14

U: In practical terms, this may be viewed as a bubble in the equity, housing and mortgage
markets in the U.S., the latter providing …nancial assets that o¤er su¢ cient rewards to be
attractive to the rest of the world. Another fundamental assumption is that the bubble bursts
at t = 0, leaving investors (both locals and foreigners) to look for alternative stores of value. In
the …rst stage, a ‡ight-to-quality reaction migrates the bubble to “good”assets and so the price
of commodities (notably, Z) jumps, which results in a signi…cant wealth transfer from U to M .
In the second stage, under the assumption that the …nancial asset crisis and wealth transfer
precipitates a severe growth slowdown, the excess demand for the “good” asset is destroyed,
leading to a decrease in inventory of the good Z, and the bubble in commodity prices collapses.
Accordingly, this model can describe events in which asset bubbles emerged and subsequently collapsed creating a sequence of bubble e¤ects in one market after another. When the
real estate bubble crashed and the value of MBS securities fell substantially, liquidity ‡owed
into other markets creating bubbles in commodities and oil markets as investors transferred
…nancial assets. The deepening …nancial crisis then sharply slowed down economic growth,
which in turn destroyed the commodity bubbles. Obviously, this story makes strong predictions concerning the timing of the origination and the collapse of various bubble phenomena
in di¤erent markets. To evaluate the evidence in support of such interpretations of the events,
consistent date stamping of those events is critical.

2.4

Econometric Dating of the Timeline
Bubbles can be de…nitively identi…ed only in hindsight after a market correction
(Economist, June 18, 2005)

The time path of Pt in the rational bubble model (with bubble component Bt ) is explosive.
Similarly, in the run-up phase of a …nancial bubble, a pattern of stochastically explosive or
mildly explosive behavior is a characteristic feature. The econometric determination of bubble
behavior therefore relies on a test procedure having power to discriminate between unit root
(or martingale like) local behavior in a process and mildly explosive stochastic alternatives.
The same distinction in reverse is required during a bubble collapse. Phillips and Magdalinos
(2007a, 2007b, hereafter PM) analyzed the properties of mildly explosive stochastic processes
and developed a limit theory for autoregressive coe¢ cient estimation and inference in that
context.
PWY (2009) used forward recursive regression techniques and PM asymptotics to test for
the presence of mildly explosive behavior in 1990s Nasdaq data and to date stamp the orig-
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ination and collapse of the Nasdaq bubble. It was shown that a sup unit root test against a
mildly explosive alternative obtained from forward recursive regressions has power to detect
periodically collapsing bubbles. To improve the power and sharpen date detection, this paper
modi…es the sup test of PWY by selecting the initial condition based on an information criterion. The new methods are used in combination with the limit theory in Phillips and Yu
(2009) which establishes consistency of the dating estimators.
The key idea of PWY is simple to implement and relies on recursively calculated rightsided unit root tests to assess evidence for mildly explosive behavior in the data. In particular,
for time series fXt gnt=1 , we apply standard unit root tests (such as the coe¢ cient test or the

Dickey-Fuller t test) with usual unit root asymptotics under the null against the alternative of
an explosive or mildly explosive root. The test is a right-sided test and therefore di¤ers from
the usual left-sided tests for stationarity. Contrary to the quotation that heads this section, it
is possible by means of these tests to identify the emergence of mildly explosive behavior as it
occurs, thereby presaging bubble conditions. It is not necessary to wait for a market correction
to identify bubble conditions in hindsight.
More speci…cally, we estimate the following autoregressive speci…cation by recursive least
squares
Xt =

+ Xt

1

+ "t ; "t

iid (0;

2

);

(10)

allowing for the fact that the iid assumption may be relaxed with the usual (possibly semiparametric) adjustments to the tests. The null hypothesis is H0 :
alternative hypothesis is H1 :

= 1 and the right-tailed

> 1; which allows for mildly explosive autoregressions with

= 1 + c=kn ; where kn ! 1 and kn =n ! 0:

The regression in the …rst recursion uses

0

= [nr0 ] observations, for some fraction r0 of

the total sample where [ ] denotes the integer part of its argument. Subsequent regressions
employ this originating data set supplemented by successive observations giving a sample of
size

= [nr] for r0

r

1: Denote the corresponding coe¢ cient test statistic and the Dickey-

Fuller t statistic by DFr and DFrt , namely,
DFr :=

^ ( )

1 ; DFrt :=

where ^ is the least squares estimate of
~j
the corresponding estimate of 2 ; and X

1

P

~2
j=1 Xj
^2

1

!1=2

^ ( )

1 ;

(11)

based on the …rst = [nr] observations, ^ 2 is
P
1
= Xj 1
j=1 Xj 1 : Obviously, DF1 and

DF1t correspond to the full sample test statistics. Under the null hypothesis of pure unit root

dynamics and using standard weak convergence methods (Phillips, 1987), we have the following
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limit theory as

= [nr] ! 1 for all r 2 [r0 ; 1]
R1

R1
f dW
f dW
W
W
t
DFr ) R 1
; DFr ) R0
;
f2
1 f 2 1=2
0 W
W
0
0

f (r) = W (r)
where W is standard Brownian motion and W
motion.

R1
0

(12)

W is demeaned Brownian

If Model (10) is the true data generating process for all t, then recursive regressions are

unnecessary. In this case, a right-sided unit root test based on the full sample is able to distinguish a unit root null from an explosive alternative. In practice, of course, empirical bubble
characteristics are much more complicated than model (10) and involve some regime change(s)
between unit root (martingale) behavior with

= 1 and mildly explosive behavior with

>1

and potential re-initialization as market temperature shifts from normal to exuberant sentiment and back again. A distinguishing empirical feature of bubble behavior is that market
correction typically occurs as sentiment reverts back and mildly explosive behavior collapses.
A model to capture this type of reversion was …rst constructed by Evans (1991) who argued
that conventional unit root tests had little power in detecting periodically collapsing bubbles
generated in this manner. As shown in Phillips and Yu (2009), such a model which mixes a
unit root process with a collapsed explosive process actually behaves like a unit root process
over the full sample (in fact, with some bias toward stationarity as explained below), thereby
invalidating the standard unit root test as a discriminating criterion when it is applied to the
full sample.
To …nd evidence for the presence of a bubble in the full sample, PWY (2009) suggest using
a sup statistic based on the recursive regression. This involves comparing supr DFrt with the
1=2
Rr
R
f dW= r W
f2
right tailed critical values from the limit distribution based on supr2[r ;1] W
.
0

0

0

Similarly, for the coe¢ cient test, one can compare the sup statistic supr DFr with the right
Rr
R
f dW= r W
f2.
tailed critical values from the limit distribution based on supr2[r0 ;1] 0 W
0

Our approach to …nding the timeline of the bubble dynamics also makes use of forward

recursive regressions. We date the origination of the bubble by the estimate ^e = [n^
re ] ; where
r^e = inf

s r0

and cv
(DFrt )

n

n
o
n
o
s : DFs > cv n ; or r^e = inf s : DFst > cv df ;

(cv df ) is the right-side 100
n

statistic based on

n

s r0

s

n%

(13)

critical value of the limit distribution of the DFr

= [ns] observations, and

n

is the size of the one-sided test.

Conditional on …nding some originating date r^e for (mildly) explosive behavior, we date the
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collapse of the bubble by ^f = [n^
rf ] ; where
r^f =

inf
s r^e +

log(n)
n

n
o
s : DFs < cv n ; or r^f =

inf
s r^e +

log(n)
n

n
o
s : DFst < cv df :

(14)

n

This dating rule for ^f requires that the duration of the bubble is nonnegligible –at least a small
in…nity as measured by log n, so that episodes of smaller order than log n are not considered
signi…cant in the dating algorithm for

f:

This requirement helps to reduce the type I error in

the unit root test without a¤ecting the consistency property of the estimator.
The consistent estimation of re and rf requires a slow divergence rate of critical values.
n
o
For practical implementation, we set the critical value sequences cv n ; cv df according to an
n

expansion rule such as cv

n

= (log log2 [nr])=2 and cv df = (log log2 [nr])=4: Both these critical
n

values diverge at a slowly varying rate with cv df < cv n : For practically reasonable sample
n

sizes, these critical values are close to the 1% critical values for DF1 and DF1t . For example,
when n = 100, cv

n

= (log log2 n)=2 = 1:17 and cv df = (log log2 n)=4 = 0:58. The 1% critical
n

values for DF1 and DF1t are 1.14 and 0.63, respectively. These critical value expansion rates
have been trialed in extensive simulations in Phillips and Yu (2009) and found to give very
satisfactory results in terms of small size and high discriminatory power.
Under the mildly explosive bubble model,
Xt = Xt 1 1 ft < e g + n Xt 1 1 f e t
fg
0
1
t
X
+@
"k + X f A 1 ft > f g + "t 1 ft
k=

n

f +1

c
= 1+
; c > 0;
n

(15)
fg

2 (0; 1) ;

p

p

Phillips and Yu (2009) showed that r^e ! re and r^f ! rf under some general regularity
conditions. Model (15) mixes together two processes, a unit root process and a mildly explosive
process with a root above 1 taking the form
over

e

t

f

n

= 1 + nc . This type of mildly explosive process

was originally proposed and analyzed by PM (2007a, 2007b). However, the

above system is more complex because it involves regime switches from unit root to mildly
explosive behavior at

e

and from the mildly explosive root back to a unit root at

f.

At

f,

the switch also involves a re-initialization of the process and Xt collapses to X f ; corresponding
to a bubble collapse back to fundamental values prevailing prior to the emergence of the bubble.
We may, for instance, set X

f

=X

e

+ X for some Op (1) random quantity X ; so that X

is within an Op (1) realization of the pre-bubble value of Xt :
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f

Under this model speci…cation (15), Phillips and Yu (2009) showed that when
[ e;

f ),

^n ( )

DFr =
and

P

e2
j=1 Xj

DFrt =

Hence, provided cv

n

^2

^n ( )

rc + op (1) ! +1;

1 = n1

3=2 r 3=2
=2 c
1=2
21=2 re

goes to in…nity at a slower rate than n1

at a slower rate than n1
= [nr] >

1

!1=2

1 = n1

=2 ,

= [nr] 2

f1 + op (1)g ! +1:
and cv df (r) goes to in…nity
n

DFr and DFrt both consistently estimate re . Moreover, when

f,

DFr =

^n ( )

1 =

n1

rc !

1;

(16)

and
DFrt =

P

e2
j=1 Xj 1
2
^

!1=2

^n ( )

1 =

n(1+

1=2 r 1=2
)=2 c
21=2

f1 + op (1)g !

1:

(17)

Hence, DFr and DFrt both consistently estimate rf . Importantly, (16) diverges to negative
in…nity, so it is apparent that in the post bubble period > f the autoregressive coe¢ cient
^n ( ) is biased downwards, which in this case means biased towards stationarity. This bias is
explained by the fact that the collapse of the bubble produces a mean reverting e¤ect in the
data, which manifests in the limit theory as a slight bias towards stationarity in the estimated
unit root.
We now provide some heuristic discussion about the capacity of these forward recursive
regression tests to capture the timeline of bubble activity. The tests have discriminatory power
because they are sensitive to the changes that occur when a process undergoes a change from
a unit root to a mildly explosive root or vice versa. This sensitivity is much greater than in
left-sided unit root tests against stationary alternatives, due to the downward bias and long left
tail in the distribution of the autoregressive coe¢ cient in unit root and near stationary cases.
By contrast, as is apparent ex post in the data when there has been a bubble, the trajectories
implied by unit root and mildly explosive processes di¤er in important ways. Although a unit
root process can generate successive upward movements, these movements still have a random
wandering quality unlike those of a stochastically explosive process where there is a distinct
nonlinearity in movement and little bias in the estimation of the autoregressive coe¢ cient.
Forward recursive regressions are sensitive to the changes implied by this nonlinearity. When
data from the explosive (bubble) period are included in estimating the autoregressive coe¢ cient, these observations quickly in‡uence the estimate and its asymptotic behavior due to the
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dominating e¤ect of the signal from mildly explosive data. This di¤erence in signal between
the two periods provides identifying information and explains why the two test procedures
consistently estimate the origination date. When the bubble bursts and the system switches
back to unit root behavior, the signal from the explosive period continues to dominate that of
unit root period. This domination, which at this point is e¤ectively a domination by initial
conditions, is analogous to the domination by distant initializations that can occur in unit root
limit theory, as shown recently by Phillips and Magdalinos (2009). More than this, the crash
and re-initialization give the appearance in the data of a form of mean reversion to an earlier
state, so that the estimated autoregressive coe¢ cient is smaller than unity and the classical
unit root test statistics diverge to minus in…nity, as shown in (16) and (17) above.

2.5

Initialization

To improve the power of the PWY procedure, we modify the methods by selecting the initial
condition based on the Schwarz (1978) BIC criterion. In PWY, the initial observation in each
recursive regression was …xed to the …rst observation of the full sample. While this choice
is convenient, when time series mix a non-explosive regime with an explosive regime, a more
powerful test is obtained if the recursive statistics are calculated using sample data from a
single regime for bubble detection. This observation motivates us to use the data to choose
the initialization. The method follows an approach to endogenize initialization in time series
regression that was suggested in Phillips (1996).
Suppose an origination date ^e has been identi…ed by the procedure of PWY2 . Let nmin
be the number of observations in a base sample of the observations fX

e

nmin +1 ; : : : ; X

e

g:

The base sample may be constructed by taking some percentage of the sample before ^e : In

our applications below we use 10%: For the base sample, we compare the BIC value of two
competing models – a unit root model and an autoregressive model. If the BIC value of the
unit root model is smaller and the point estimate of
condition to

e

is larger than 1, we reset the initial

nmin + 1. Otherwise, we expand the base sample to fX

e

nmin ; : : : ; X

e

g,

that is another observation is added to the beginning of the sample. Based on the new sample,
we again compare the BIC value of the competing models. If the BIC value of the unit root
model is smaller and the point estimate of
to

e

is larger than 1, we reset the initial condition

nmin . This exercise is repeated until the BIC value of the unit root model is smaller.

2

In case no bubble is found, no change in the PWY procedure is required. However, a ‡exible moving
window recursive approach is also possible, which allows for variable initializations, and may be more e¤ective
in assessing evidence for multiple bubbles.
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If the sample eventually becomes fX1 ; : : : ; X e g and the BIC value of the unit root model is
still larger, we set the initial condition to t = 1; which is the same as that used in PWY. If

the initialization emerging from this procedure is ^0 ; then the recursive testing methodology of
PYW is applied from ^0 . With this initialization, denote the estimate of the origination date
^e (^0 ) and the estimate of the collapse date ^f (^0 ). Obviously, ^e (1) = ^e and ^f (1) = ^f .
However, if ^0 > 1, it is possible that ^e (^0 ) 6= ^e and ^f (^0 ) 6= ^f . In general it is expected
that ^e (^0 )

^e since the backward recursion to locate the initialization ^0 begins from ^e :

Assume the sample is X

e

P

e

t=

ln

nmin nk +1 ; : : : ; X

e

e

2!

X

Xt

nmin nk

. The BIC value of the unit root model is

nk + nmin

+

ln(nk + nmin )
;
nk + nmin

whereas the BIC value of the autogression is
0

where X =

B
ln @

1
nmin +nk

P

t=

P

autoregressive model

e

nmin nk

nk + nmin

e

t=

e

Xt

e

nmin nk +1 Xt ,

b

2

bXt

1

1

C 2 ln(nk + nmin )
;
A+
nk + nmin

b and b are the OLS estimators of

Xt =

+ Xt

1

and

from the

+ "t :

It is known that when the criterion is applied in this way BIC can consistently (i.e. almost
surely as n ! 1) distinguish a unit root model from a stationary model without specifying

transient dynamics (see Phillips, 2008). Using similar methods it can be shown that BIC

consistently distinguishes a unit root model from a model with an explosive root. In essence,
the use of BIC to select the initialization is equivalent to the use of BIC to choose a break
point, although in the present case it is not necessary to speci…cy transient behavior.

3

Data

Two datasets are studied in the empirical work reported here. The primary data constitute
seven …nancial time series: the monthly Nasdaq composite price index (without dividends)
over January 1990 to January 2009; the monthly U.S. house price index over January 1987 to
January 2009; the monthly outstanding asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) in the U.S.
over January 2001 to January 2009; monthly crude oil prices (in US dollars) over January
1999 to January 2009; monthly platinum prices (in US dollars) over January 1999 to January
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2009; the daily Baa bond rates from January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009; and the weekly
Pound/USD exchange rates from March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009.
A secondary dataset is studied to check whether the empirical bubble characteristics found
in the primary series apply to other commodities and exchange rates. The secondary data
include some commodity prices such as monthly heating oil, co¤ee, cotton, cocoa, sugar, feeder
cattle prices, all measured in USD and over January 1999 to January 2009, and some exchange
rates, such as the weekly Euro/USD exchange rates, the Yen/USD exchange rates and the
Cnd/USD exchange rates, all observed over March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009.
The choice of the sampling periods is judiciously guided by CFG (2008a) because we aim
to match the empirical analysis with the predictions made in CFG. The CFG story begins with
the internet bubble in the Nasdaq in the 1990s –see page 7 in CFG –and ends with the collapse
of all …nancial bubbles when the economy goes seriously into recession. For the Baa bond rates,
it is well known that a relevant event that signaled the e¤ects of the credit crunch is the failure
of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. The sampling period is chosen so that we have
enough observations before September 15 for the bubble test to have good power. Similar
auguments apply to the choice of the sampling period for the exchange rates. However, other
sampling intervals, all covering the subprime crisis period, have been used and the empirical
…ndings reported here are reasonably robust to the choice of the sample period.
The Nasdaq composite price index is obtained from …nance.yahoo.com. It extends the
sample used in PWY by including more recent observations from June 2005 to January 2009.
PWY found strong evidence of a bubble in the Nasdaq during the 1990s, associated with the
dom.com episode. We extend the sample period in order to check whether there are any subsequent bubbles prior to the subprime crisis. The house price index is the seasonally adjusted
S&P Case Shiller composite-10 index obtained from Robert Shiller’s website, and represents
the maximum time span of this data. The outstanding commercial paper data is for asset
backed commercial paper (ABCP) obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. The ABCP time
series is a crude indicator of the size of the mortgage and subprime market. The crude oil price
series is based on WTI - Cushing, Oklahoma spot prices obtained from the Energy Information
Administration website. The platinum price series is obtained from the kitco website. The
Baa bond rates are averages of Baa industrial bond rates and are obtained from the Federal
Reserve Board. This variable measures the credit risk level and is particularly relevant because,
as the crisis unfolded, the sharp drop in the prices and market liquidity of all mortgage-backed
securities led a sharp increase in the price of risk and in spreads. Not surprisingly, mutual
mistrust amongst counterparties surged and bond rates jumped. Finally, the Pound/USD ex22

change rates are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board. For the secondary dataset, all the
commodity prices are downloaded from EconStats (http://www.econstats.com/index.htm) and
all the exchange rates are downloaded from the Federal Reserve Board. All time series, except
for the exchange rates and the Baa bond rates, are de‡ated using the Consumer Price Index
(CPI), which is obtained from the Department of Labor. Figs. 1-3 plot all of seven series in
the primary dataset. Table 1 reports some summary descriptive statistics for these seven time
series, including sample size, sample frequency, sample minimum, date of the minimum, sample
maximum, date of the maximum, as well as the coe¢ cient statistic (DF1 ) and DF-t statistic
(DF1t ) based on the entire sample.
Table 1: Summary statistics
Data
Nasdaq
House
ABCP
Oil
Platinum
Baa
Pound/USD

Sample
Size
432
265
97
121
121
772
158

Freq

Min

M
M
M
M
M
D
W

1.1002
.4924
3314.8
.0730
2.0879
6.08
.4775

Date
(min)
Sep 1974
Oct 1996
Sep 2008
Feb 1999
Aug 1999
Dec/21/06
Nov/9/07

Max
27.66
1.1340
5817.1
.6118
9.5841
9.54
.7240

Date
(max)
Jan 2000
Feb 2006
July 2007
June 2008
Mar 2008
Oct/31/08
Jan/23/09

DF1

DF1t

-4.6476
-0.3124
-2.3631
-3.6298
-3.4287
-1.0436
1.9719

-1.5614
-0.5272
-1.1098
-1.5713
-1.5088
-0.4544
1.0594

The real Nasdaq index reached its maximum of 27.66 in January 2000 growing from a
minimum of 1.1 in September 1974. The house price index troughed in October 1996 and
peaked in February 2006. Interestingly, the minimum value for the ABCP was reached in
September 2008, barely a year after its maximum (July, 2007). This timing suggests a strong
decline in the index over the period August 2007 to September 2008 when the subprime crisis
swept through the mortgage market. The crude oil price and platinum price series follow the
same pattern, having their minima in the early part of the sample and reaching the maxima
in mid-2008. The rate for Baa is lowest (6.81) on December 21, 2006 and highest (9.54)
on October 31, 2008, shortly after the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15. The
Pound/USD exchange rate series is volatile, moving rapidly from 0.4775 on November 9, 2007
to 0.7240 on Jan 23, 2009. At the 5% level, for only one series (namely the Pound/USD
exchange rate) is the unit root null rejected in favor of an explosive alternative for the full
sample (the 5% asymptotic critical values are, respectively, -0.13 and -0.07 for the two unit
root test statistics DF1 and DF1t ).
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4

Empirical Results

Three phases have been identi…ed in connection with the subprime crisis. According to CFG
(2008a), each phase involves a speci…c hypothesis that concerns related bubble activity. In the
…rst phase (A), before the subprime crisis publicly erupted, bubbles had emerged and burst in
the stock market, the housing market, and mortgage market. These bubbles all played a role
in global imbalances. In particular, three hypotheses are in order.
Hypothesis A1: A bubble originated and collapsed in the stock market prior to the
emergence of the subprime crisis.
Hypothesis A2: A bubble originated in the housing market following the Nasdaq crash
in late 2000 and burst when the subprime crisis emerged in August 2007.
Hypothesis A3: A bubble originated and collapsed in mortgage market securities, the
collapse coinciding with the public eruption of the subprime crisis in August 2007.
During the second phase (B), the subprime crisis broke and funds ‡owed selectively to
assets in other markets with lower perceived risk. In consequence, bubbles emerged in certain
commodity and foreign exchange markets and credit risk perceptions shot up, leading to the
following hypotheses:
Hypothesis B1: Bubbles originated in certain commodity price markets and exchange
rates following the eruption of the subprime crisis.
Hypothesis B2: Bubbles originated in the bond market as the subprime crisis unfolded.
In the third phrase (C), as perceptions increased that there would be a potentially serious
impact of the …nancial crisis on real economic activity in the U.S and globally, the …nancial
bubbles in commodity prices and the bond market collapsed. Correspondingly, we have another
hypothesis:
Hypothesis C: Bubbles that had arisen in commodity prices and the bond market collapsed.
We now report and discuss the empirical results. First, we check for statistical evidence
of the presence of bubble(s) in each of the time series based on the recursively calculated
sup statistics max DFr and max DFrt . Table 2 reports critical values for these two statistics
obtained by simulation for the two sample sizes, 100 and 500. The critical values for max DFrt
are nearly identical to those reported in PWY. The critical values for max DFr are about twice
as large as those for max DFrt . This is not surprising as the critical values for the conventional
unit root statistic DFr are about twice as large as those for DFrt (see, for example, Fuller,
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2000).
Table 2: Critical values of max DFr and max DFrt obtained in simulations
Sample Size
500
500
100
100

Test Statistic
max DFr
max DFrt
max DFr
max DFrt

10%
2.3525
1.1800
2.3221
1.1914

5%
2.8791
1.4603
2.9470
1.5073

1%
3.9619
2.0043
4.3412
2.1899

The …rst two rows in Table 3 report values for the two statistics based on the seven time
series with

0

= 0:1. All cases show overwhelming evidence for the presence of bubbles. The

p-values are all less than 1% for data other than the crude oil price. For the crude oil price, the
p-value is between 1% and 5%. Judging from the magnitude of the two statistics, the bubble
characteristics are strongest in the Nasdaq, House prices and Baa.
Table 3: Testing the Presence of Bubbles and Date Stamping3
max DFr
max DFrt
be (^0 )
bf (^0 )

Nasdaq
18.026
8.2106
June/95
Nov/00

Home Price
5.7668
14.625
Sep/00
June/07

ABCP
4.5963
4.9612
Aug/05
July/07

Oil
4.2131
2.3652
Mar/08
Aug/08

Next we estimate the origination and collapse dates,

Platinum
5.063
2.565
Jan/08
July/08
e

and

f

Baa
19.156
5.1876
Oct/8/08
Dec/4/08

Pnd/USD
7.5524
2.6286
Oct/24/08
NA

and report these in the last

two rows in Table 3. Table 4 shows the di¤erence between be (^0 ) and bf (^0 ), the estimates
based on the endogenized initialization, and be (1) and bf (1), the estimates based on the initial-

ization proposed by PWY. The two sets of estimates turn out to be the same for the Nasdaq,
Oil, Plantinum and Baa series. But they di¤er by 1-4 periods for Home prices, ABCP and

Pound/USD (shown in bold face in Table 4). When they are di¤erent, be (^0 ) is always smaller,
suggesting that the endogenized initialization indeed gives an earlier warning.

Table 4: Estimates of the Origination and Collapse Dates Based on Endogenized

be (1)
be (^0 )
bf (1)
bf (^0 )
3
4

Nasdaq
June/95
June/95
Nov/00
Nov/00

Home Price
Jan/01
Sep/00
Aug/07
June/07

The reported estimated
The reported estimated

e
e

and
and

f
f

Initializations4
ABCP
Oil
Nov/05 Mar/08
Aug/05 Mar/08
Aug/07 Aug/08
July/07 Aug/08
are based on DFt .
are based on DFt .
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Platinum
Jan/08
Jan/08
July/08
July/08

Baa
Oct/8/08
Oct/8/08
Dec/4/08
Dec/4/08

Pnd/USD
Oct/31/08
Oct/24/08
NA
NA

Time series plots of the recursively calculated statistics DFr and DFrt are shown in Figs.
5-11. Superposed on these plots are the critical value paths, log log2 [nr] =2; log log2 [nr] =4, the
estimated dates be (^0 ), bf (^0 ), and the onset date for the subprime crisis. Recall that Figs.

1-3 plot be (^0 ) and bf (^0 ), together with the time series data. In all of these cases, we clearly
identify an explosive subperiod in the data.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from the estimates and Figs. 1–3 and 5-11. First,

the estimated origination and collapse dates seem to cover a subperiod of signi…cant price
run-up in each of the time series. Second, the estimated origination dates are not the same
as the apparent beginning of these run-up periods. This may be because a unit root process
as well as processes with very mildly explosive roots that are closer to unity than an O n

1

neighborhood can also generate mild run-ups but the latter are indistinguishable from a unit
root root process. The present tests have substantial discriminatory power for mildly explosive
roots beyond those of O n

1

neighborhoods and are consistent against such alternatives.

Third, both statistics DFr and DFrt lead to the same or very similar dating estimates, except
for house prices, which are discussed below.
Some speci…c conclusions can be drawn for the individual time series and these are summarized below.
1. For the Nasdaq series, a very signi…cant bubble is found by both DFr and DFrt statistics
over June 1995 to Oct 2000. The estimates be and bf are identical to those found in
PWY, although a di¤erent statistic (the augmented Dickey-Fuller test) was employed
there, the data sources (both for the index and the de‡ator) di¤er, and the sample period
is shorter in PWY. Interestingly, no bubble is found over the more recent period even
though there was some run up in prices before the subprime crisis. Note that the Nasdaq
bubble collapsed several years prior to the subprime crisis. So the results are entirely
consistent with hypothesis A1.
2. For the House Price series, again a very signi…cant bubble is found by both DFr and
DFrt ; but this time during the 2000s. Compared with DFrt , the statistic DFr is three
months later in identifying the bubble but nine months earlier identifying the collapse of
the bubble. In both cases, our estimates of the bubble origination date in the early 2000s
strongly support the argument in Baker (2002), who claimed that there was a housing
bubble at the time. According to DFr , the bubble collapsed in June 2007 just before the
subprime crisis erupted, consistent with hypothesis A2.
3. For the ABCP series, a signi…cant bubble is found by both DFr and DFrt over August
26

2005 to July 2007. Note that in this case the origination date be comes several years

later than that of the House Price series, re‡ecting the lag in packaging mortgages into
…nancial derivatives and related products. The bubble collapsed in July 2007 when the
subprime crisis became apparent, consistent with hypothesis A3.

4. For Crude Oil prices, neither DFr nor DFrt identi…es a bubble before the subprime crisis
broke out. However, a signi…cant bubble is found by both DFr and DFrt over March
2008 to July 2008. The bubble emerged in March 2008 after the subprime crisis broke,
consistent with hypothesis B1. The bubble collapsed in August 2008, consistent with
hypothesis C.
5. For Platinum prices, the recursions of DFr and DFrt both include two periods (one
at the beginning of the sample and the other in the middle of the sample) where the
statistics exceed the critical values. However, the durations are so short so that the log(n)
separating rule for minimum bubble duration suggests that these should be interpreted
as short-lived run-ups not bubbles. However, a signi…cant bubble is found by both DFr
and DFrt over January 2008 to June 2008. The bubble emerged in January 2008 after
the subprime crisis broke, consistent with hypothesis B1. The bubble collapsed in July
2008, consistent with hypothesis C.
6. For the Baa bond rates, while both DFr and DFrt suggest random wandering behavior
for much of the period, both also indicate a short but signi…cant bubble over the period
from October 18, 2008 to December 3, 2008. This period corresponds with the period of
the rapid acceleration of …nancial distress, soon after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy.
The bubble emerged in the bond market on October 8, 2008 after the subprime crisis
erupted, consistent with hypotheses B2 and C.
7. Finally, for the Pound/USD exchange rate, a signi…cant bubble is found by both DFr
and DFrt : The bubble emerged on October 24, 2008 after the subprime crisis, consistent
with hypothesis C. However, the bubble persists until the end of our sample, March 20,
2009 and remains an ongoing characteristic in the data.
In sum, all these tests provide empirical support for hypotheses A - C, showing bubble
characteristics in the data that are consistent with the hypotheses. The empirical estimates on
the timeline of the crisis also broadly support the predictions made in the CFG (2008a) model.
Fig. 12 shows the complete timeline of the bubble process. The timeline shows how bubbles
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Figure 5: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the real Nasdaq index
from February 1973 to January 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.

migrated from the equity market (in particular the Nasdaq index), …rst to the housing market,
and next to the mortgage market before the subprime crisis. After the subprime crisis, the
bubbles selectively moved to certain goods in commodity markets and certain currencies in the
foreign exchange market.
To assess whether or not bubble characteristics were a generic or speci…c feature in commodity and foreign exchange markets during the …nancial crisis, we applied the methods more
broadly to many series in a secondary dataset. To preserve space, we present only the summary
empirical results in Table 4 without plotting the recursive test statistics.
Although it is clear from the empirical results obtained earlier that funds moved across
markets during the crisis period for ‡ight-to-quality and ‡ight-to-liquidity reasons, the results
in Table 4 suggest that investors were selective in transferring assets. For example, in the
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Figure 6: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the real seasonally
adjusted home price composite 10 index from January 1987 to January 2009, obtained from
forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 7: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the real outstanding
values for asset-backed commercial paper from January 2001 to January 2009, obtained from
forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 8: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the real crude oil price
from January 1999 to January 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 9: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the real platinum price
from January 1999 to January 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 10: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the Baa bond rates
from January 3, 2006 to January 30, 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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Figure 11: Recursive calculation of the coe¢ cient test and t statistic for the Pound/USD
exchange rates March 17, 2006 to March 20, 2009, obtained from forward recursive regressions.
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commodity market, we identify a bubble in heating oil prices, with similar origination and
collapsing dates as those for crude oil prices. However, we …nd no evidence of bubbles in
co¤ee, cotton, sugar, and feeder cattle prices. In the foreign exchange market, we locate a
bubble in the Cnd/USD exchange rate, which originated on September 21, 2007 and burst on
November 23, 2007.

Interestingly, the origination date is about one year earlier than that

in the Pound/USD exchange rate. However, no bubble is found in the Euro/USD exchange
rate. Although the value of the max DFr statistic is marginally higher than the corresponding
critical value for Cocoa and the Yen/USD rate, detailed analysis of the recursive calculations
of the test statistic shows that the run-ups only lasted for a couple of periods and therefore do
not survive the log(n) separating rule for minimum bubble duration.
Table 4: Test Results for the Presence of Bubbles and Date Stamps
Heating oil
Co¤ee
Cotton
Cocoa
Sugar
Feeder cattle
Euro/USD
Yen/USD
Cnd/USD

5

max DFr
6.9092
-1.6035
-0.2466
2.4876
-0.7408
1.0336
0.4091
3.8949
4.0494

max DFrt
2.2416
-0.7002
-0.0866
0.9872
-0.2220
0.4327
0.3311
1.4247
2.6956

be
March/08
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Sep/21/07

bf
August/08
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
Nov/23/07

Conclusions

This paper provides an empirical study of the bubble characteristics in several key …nancial
variables over an historical time period that includes the subprime crisis and its sequel, including
global e¤ects. The econometric methods employed are based on recursive regression, rightsided unit root tests and a newly developed dating technology and associated limit theory from
Phillips and Yu (2009). These methods enable us to track the timeline of the crisis in terms of
the individual series by empirically dating the origination and collapse of each of the bubbles.
The dates are matched against the onset date for the subprime crisis as well as a speci…c
sequential hypothesis concerning bubble migrations that are predicted in the theoretical model
proposed by CFG (2008a). Our estimates suggest that bubbles migrated from the equity market
to the housing market and on to the subprime mortgage derivative market before the crisis
broke. After the crisis erupted into the public arena, the pricing bubbles migrated to selected
commodity markets and, in some cases, the foreign exchange market, suggesting a ‡ight-to35

quality or perceived safe haven phenomena. All these bubbles collapsed as the …nancial crisis
impacted real economic activity. The estimated sequence of the bubble migration phenomenon
is broadly consistent with the predictions of CFG (2008a).
The methods used here may also be used to provide early warning diagnostics for market
exuberance as they provide consistent tests for mildly explosive behavior. Such diagnostics may
assist policy makers in framing early monetary policy responses or other regulatory actions or
interventions to combat speculative bubbles in …nancial markets.
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Figure 12: Timeline of …nancial bubbles in the stock, real estate, mortgate, commodity, bond,
and foreign exchange markets. The panels show recursive calculations of the coe¢ cient statistic
and critical values highlighting the successive bubble episodes.
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